Interventions on the state of sovereignty at the border

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ARTICLE INFO

Article history:
Received 15 September 2016
Received in revised form 22 November 2016
Accepted 7 February 2017
Available online 17 February 2017

Corridors, camps, and spaces of confinement

Reece Jones and Corey Johnson

Recent events have put human encounters with state sovereignty at borders under intense scrutiny from governments, media, and academics alike. Over 40,000 people died attempting to cross a border from 2006 to 2015 and a record 65 million people were displaced by conflict around the world in 2015 (http://missingmigrants.iom.int/). These 40,000 deaths are not the direct results of wars where humans become the casualties of state-to-state conflicts or internal strife. Rather, they are a consequence of states expanding the reach of their security and detention practices to capture, intercede, or make intentionally perilous the movements of people in search of better opportunities or often just basic safety and human dignity—for themselves and their family. There are almost 70 border walls around the world, up from 15 in 1989 (Vallet, 2014), and these are just the most visible physical manifestations of what is much wider set of state practices to control movement such as deployments of more border guards, seaborne patrols, and investments in new technologies to monitor more comprehensively events within state space, at the edges of their territories, and beyond.

These proactive and reactive exercises of state power mirror, and likely also help stir up, nationalist political rhetoric that emphasizes the rights of the in-group of citizens at the expense of non-citizens. The election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States, who called for finishing the wall on the US-Mexico border and banning Muslim immigration, and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom that was fueled by a fear of migrants and a desire for more national control over economic decisions are but two examples of anti-migration sentiments seeping into mainstream politics. Against this backdrop, and inspired by recent scholarship in political geography, political science, and border studies, these interventions spatialize the sovereignty of the state at the border by considering how scholars should interpret the global expansion of security infrastructure ranging from new walls to the deployment of drones and military hardware to monitor and secure space. The interdisciplinary group of scholars was asked to intervene on the question: What is the state of sovereignty at the border?

The first common theme is the emergence of new corridors where people on the move use technologies to subvert authority and survive the transit through dangerous and unwelcoming places, while the presence of state and non-state actors funnel people to particular routes. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins argues in her contribution, non-governmental aid organizations are increasingly implicated in humanitarian borderwork, which produces the border at multiple scales of sovereignty as individuals and organizations shape the spatial extent of the state. Similarly, Emily Gilbert’s contribution details the role of individuals and organizations that create corridors through which resettled refugees find their way to Canada.

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Just as states and affiliated organizations attempt to impose sovereign control over people on the move, people use new corridors and informal camps to refuse to submit to sovereign state control. Recent work has placed emphasis on the growing digital divide—in this case between the digitization of human life through what Gabriel Popescu in his contribution calls “a portal-like logic” of border busting digital technologies on the one hand, and the persistently territorialized spatialization of sovereign state power on the other. Witness refugees’ negotiation of border controls by means of GPS, Facebook, and crowdsourcing in Southeastern Europe and you have a good sense of the “non-linear territorial logics” that make this refugee crisis so different than past ones, albeit with similarly all-too-frequent tragic outcomes.

Alison Mountz’s contribution points to another new location of borderwork: camps on islands. Mountz echoes Lauren Benton’s (2010) work on the practice of sovereignty during the period of European Colonization, which was not a uniform expansion of colonial sovereign control, but rather a fragmented and piecemeal effort characterized by nodes of power emplaced in settlements, islands, and sea lanes. Contemporary border enforcement and mobility management increasingly happen in a similarly uneven geographical configuration of island camps and corridors where movement occurs and where the practice of sovereignty is tactically intensified to manage flows of humans through spaces of confinement.

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The interventions that follow spatialize the sovereignty of the state: locating and interrogating the sites of new sovereign practices, identifying the individuals and organizations acting as the sovereign agents of the state, and finding space for agency in encounters between people on the move and the state. They investigate different aspects of how the management of migration is creating corridors, camps, and spaces of confinement, but they also identify new spaces of connections where migration is structured by the state, often through the medium of non-state actors, and where people on the move have the ability to shape their encounters with sovereignty and the border.

Border barriers as sovereign swords: rethinking Walled States in light of the EU migrant and fiscal crises

Wendy Brown

Many scholars have sought to explain the proliferation of nation-state walling over the past two decades, a proliferation that may seem paradoxical given that the most potent forms of power and violence today are uncontainable by physical walling. My own contribution to this effort was a 2010 book arguing that the new walls were often a political-theatrical response to eroding nation-state sovereignty (Brown, 2010). Barriers like those at the US-Mexico, India-Pakistan or South Africa-Zimbabwe borders were generally ineffective in blocking what they formally aimed to interdict. However, contemporary border walls function as symbolic and semiotic responses to crises produced by eroded sovereign state capacities to secure territory, citizens and economies against growing transnational flows of power, people, capital, religions, ideas or terror. To say these walls are more theatrical than mechanical in their function is not to dismiss their importance: the theater matters a great deal in an era in which states perdure as their sovereign powers wane, and powerful new nationalisms and reactionary citizen subjectivities are one result.

The argument of the book went further to suggest that walls do not merely index but accelerate waning state sovereignty: they blur the policing and military functions of states and also generate new vigilantism at the border; they increase organized criminal operations (and expand their transnational links) for smuggling humans, drugs, weapons and other contraban across borders; and they intensify nationalist sentiments that in turn spur demands for greater exercises of state sovereignty, more effective walling and less flexibility in responding to globalization’s vicissitudes and volatilities. In all of these ways, the new border fortifications tend to deepen the crises of sovereignty to which they also respond. Far from mere palliatives or props for degraded sovereign powers, they are a kind of pharmakon, worsening the problem they respond to even as they throw a sop to constituencies anxious or angry at states’ declining capacities to uphold social contracts to secure order, prosperity and protection.

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welfare states, public industries, union-negotiated wages and conditions, and so forth), this new set of imperatives produces a new orientation toward in-migration and out-migration. States today are concerned not only with the concrete political, social or economic costs or benefits of immigration, but with its potential impacts on the nation's attractiveness to potential creditors and investors. As Feher compresses the matter: “attracting international investors while repelling undesirable migrants: since the Great Recession of 2009, these two preoccupations have dominated the European agenda” (Feher, 2016).

This imperative is evident in Europe’s two intersecting contemporary crises: the crisis related to internally uneven debt, growth, employment, trade and national self-determination resulting from a common market and common currency in the absence of a common social contract and common polity, and the crisis related to sudden, substantial migration surges from the Middle East and North Africa, where frontline EU states are also among the EU’s most economically challenged.

As is well known, two important European Union agreements, “Schengen” (open internal European borders) and “Dublin” (refugee acceptance and processing rules undergirding the Common European Asylum System) have been threatened ever since the Arab Spring brought thousands of Tunisians to southern Europe. Both agreements reached a breaking point in 2015. Their disintegration, combined with the crisis of the Eurozone, threatens to break Europe. What has this to do with the new border barriers, such as those erected by Hungary at its Serbian and Croatian borders? Importantly these barriers do not repel but divert migration flows coming from the east and the south, and they also now link to a system channeling migrants through the Balkans and into the heart of Europe. This in turn converts whole nations into European borders, corridors rather than destinations.

The new corridors through Europe converted what began as ad hoc migrant routes and camps for immigrant travel to western and northern destinations into organized channels facilitating the movement of peoples by states and the EU (Kasperek, 2016, pp. 3; 7–8). Quasi-formalized, the corridors themselves helped establish the difference between “transit” and “destination” states, and increasingly emptied of force the Dublin proviso that the migrants’ country of entry into the EU was the country responsible for them and to which they could be returned upon reaching other parts of Europe. Border barriers, corridors and transit camps in this way become elements in an intricate, unplanned yet intensely governed structuring of space that reconfigures European geopolitics as it manages migrant bodies. This governing produces both fusions of and contestations among national, subnational and postnational forces and jurisdictions. It also produces new conditions and even new agencies for migrants themselves, a new biopolitics of migrant movement: Kasperek depicts the migrant flows through these corridors now as simultaneously state organized (they are propelled) and self-organized (the migrants propel themselves). He also explains how, as migrants are both rushing and being rushed, protected and regulated, the structures create a novel semiotics and physics of freedom and safety against the dangers of detention and deportation.

Asked why they do not leave the corridor and pursue an alternative path, the [migrants’] answer is that if you leave the flow, you are lost. Outside the corridor, you are subject to the regime of asylum, detention and deportation. Only inside the corridor, you are allowed to move (Kasperek, 2016, p. 7).

Explaning the new biopolitical regime that is emerging, Kasparek adds:

The corridor, stretching across and seemingly connecting many countries, has a constitution of its own. One might characterize it as “extraterritorial” to better capture the different laws and rules that apply within (as opposed to those without). That these rules and laws were written elsewhere goes without saying. The EU border and migration regime did not have the capacity to stop the extraordinary movement of people across its borders, but morphing the route into a confined corridor served to re-establish some kind of control over the movements (Kasperek, 2016, p. 7).

The combination of border barriers, corridors and transit camps thus become a scene of sovereignty struggles, fought out over responding to refugees in a post-Dublin order. The corridors reassert EU jurisdictional control over migrants’ challenge to that control, and also revert to the challenge of the countries they bisect as they supplant national with postnational technologies of governmentality. Simultaneously, the creation of “transit countries” creates a new layer in European bordering, as well as a new element in negotiating sovereignty from weakness—the position of Greece, Macedonia and the Balkan nations, as well as Turkey. Turkey’s agreement to grant limited asylum in exchange for $6 billion in aid, a complex exchange program and, above all, visas for Turks traveling to Europe, is at this writing on the brink of disintegrating both as a consequence of Turkey’s deportation of imperiled refugees and its treatment of those it allows to remain (Cunningham, 2016). And then there is the negotiating bid from the north: Germany’s own provisional “open door” policy, while partly contoured by labor needs and also by legitimacy deficits from its merciless handling of Greece in the summer of 2015, is above all an effort to preserve Europe from the disintegration threatened by other states following the model of Hungarian walling and brutality toward immigrants or the model of Brexit, both of which represent rising nationalist frustration with EU immigration and fiscal governance. The importance of border barriers in both expressing and fomenting this danger was signaled by the gleefulness of rightwing politicians, such as National Front leader Marine Le Pen and UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, over the walling frenzy during fall 2015: “Bye-bye Schengen!” Le Pen tweeted at its height (Economist, 2015).

Clearly, the recent border fortifications that have sprung up are more than theatrical performances of nation-state sovereignty, even as they may also be this. First, most have become part of an intricate ad hoc network of spatial and governing technologies for diverting, channeling and policy migrant flows. Walls are far better at diversion than interdiction—even the ‘failed’ wall at the US-Mexico border, while not stopping migration, has diverted it to routes costlier in terms of lives, money and crime. Europe’s new border walls thus must make manifest an obdurate physicalist fact about “flows” on land: they cannot be stopped, only routed. The sea is another matter: here flows can be dissolved and dissipated, as is evidenced by the thousands of migrants allowed to drown in the Mediterranean since the Arab Spring, as captured by the superb documentation and analyses by Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, (http://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/left-die-boat/).

At the same time, the walls intensify the fragility of the EU as they undermine both the Dublin and Schengen agreements with non-sovereign gestures of state power. They represent reactions against inegalitarian postnational and even global institutions. Meanwhile, postnational institutions are countering with their own strategies. In addition to delivering development aid to nations in exchange for accepting immigrants, there is the Juncker Commission’s development of “hotspots”—designated zones (currently only in Italy and Greece) facing “disproportionate migratory pressures” which trigger a concentrated EU response (European
As opposed to thecrudeness of border barriers, the deprivations of the Calais camps or the violent policing in the Budapest railroad station, this approach mobilizes Frontex and other EU agencies to deliver concentrated resources to process, serve and police migrants at their points of entry into the EU. As the European Commission describes it, “the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EU Border Agency (Frontex) EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol), and EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust) will work on the ground with the authorities of the frontline Member State to help to fulfill their obligations under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies will be complementary to one another.” What sounds like free and cooperative assistance, however, isn’t quite: the EU can threaten to withhold development aid and also threaten exclusion from the Schengen zone to any country refusing intervention at an EU designated hotspot. Thus, Bernd Kasparek notes, while the “hotspot approach may use the language of humanitarianism and support for the frontline member states … it is in fact a massive vote of ‘no confidence’ concerning the ability and even willingness of these states to conform to the European rules …” (Kasparek, 2016, p. 13). Through the hotspots, the Juncker Commission pushes back against assertions of nation-state prerogative with EU technocracy and biopolitics; its agencies regain EU control over immigration to Europe and control over the migrants themselves.

In sum, while Europe’s flurry of contemporary wall building certainly indexes waning state sovereignty, these walls are also pieces in complex sovereignty contests between national and postnational powers of political determination, economic arrangements and demographic composition. In contrast with the border barriers discussed in Walled States, the sovereignty at stake is not simply that of nation states undermined by global flows and powers. It is also challenged by postnational political institutions and political economic constellations. Of course, the new walls of Europe also reflect crises in Europe’s relation to itself and to the world, its uncertain future amidst a global inter-regnum between sovereign nation-states and whatever their successor forms might be, and amidst an inter-regnum between a modernity and capitalism centered on EuroAtlantic powers and whatever comes after that centering. They reflect as well a series of intersecting nationalist rejections of free trade, open borders and multiculturalist democracies. Finally at stake is democracy’s challenges from reactionnary nationalist populism on one side and postnational technocracy on the other. The former is animated by the experience of social and economic decline, and is backward-looking and fantasy-ridden; the latter is animated by imperatives of finance, expectations about technology, and steely-eyed realism. The battle between technocracy and nationalism constitutes a new theater in sovereignty struggles. Walls, corridors and irregular zones within nations are not merely backdrops but active, multiply-signifying agents in this theater. That they also organize the lives and deaths of hundreds of thousands of deracinated, desperate people on the move is, from the perspective of this theater, collateral damage.

Making space for digital technologies: the digital, the limit, and the sovereign

Gabriel Popescu

The integration of digital technologies into everyday life is transforming nation-states, sovereignty, territory and borders, serving to redefine these categories as well as the relationships between them. Digital technologies bring together issues of politics and space in ways that change how power is organized and distributed geographically. Today, people and places are increasingly connected across space following a portal-like logic that folds them into each other, unlike socio-spatial interaction in the pre-digital era which was largely mediated via territorial proximity and distance decay. This situation is accelerating the proliferation of actors involved in political processes and the types of activities they are engaged in, thus opening up new possibilities for the organization of interaction across international borders. These novel political geographies take us beyond normative understandings of territory rooted in Cartesian traditions. They require us to develop non-linear understandings of territory where inside can be outside and close can be far away, and where the dynamic spatial relations between actors are brought to the fore (Allen, 2011; Bigo, 2001).

Despite several notable contributions from security and border studies (Amoore, 2006, 2009), political geographers have been generally slow to directly engage the nexus of digital technologies, territory, and international politics. This deficit is problematic because it misses the opportunity to explore important avenues for the production of space in the digital era, as well as the effects of digital technologies on territorial politics. In this regard, it is useful to explore how digital technologies are shaping state sovereignty practices by transforming the nature of its territorial limits. Equally important is to understand how these technology-inspired border changes can be territorialized, and how to conceptualize the geographies they produce.

At the time of this writing we are trying to come to terms with the outcomes of two recent momentous events—the refugee crisis in Europe and the Brexit—where border reinforcement has been a central theme. It can be tempting to interpret the unprecedented surge in border fencing and the associated nationalist rhetoric as evidence of a return to classic sovereignty tropes of exclusive government control over national territories within their borders. Such interpretation, however, does not adequately capture the nature of these developments. As new border fences are erected, governments seek to maintain access and connectivity. Pro-Brexit advocates, for example, maintained a separatist discourse in terms of restoring British sovereignty and control over Britain’s borders, but they also argued for further opening up the British economy by signing new trade deals with overseas partners to offset the economic disadvantages of non-EU membership. Evidence from North America also shows that despite multiple rounds of border reinforcement, trade between the countries of Canada, Mexico, and the US is at an all-time high, due in large part to reliance on border-crossing digital technology. In this light, the border fence is pockmarked with gateways, and it reveals the outward affirmation of sovereignty claimed by powerful states, as well as their desire to control mobility both inside and outside their national territories.

A careful analysis of current border transformations reveals that many governments have understood the limitations of sovereignty over discrete territories in a world of technology-enabled flows. To maintain their clout, they are responding by embedding their regulatory functions in various networks of global flows with the help of digital technologies, so that sovereignty prerogatives can travel with the flows. This is achieved through dislocating linear border functions and pushing them both outward into other states’ territories and inward into national societies. In addition, bordering practices are digitized through the automation of data collection in databases and data analysis (Amoore, 2006; Popescu, 2011; Pötzsch, 2015).

Together, these developments have worked to create a border regime of continuous filtration that has produced several significant spatial outcomes. First, borders have become mobile and portable, thus opening up the entire space of the globe to potential bordering processes. Second, there has been an increase in...
bordering instances, as people can encounter borders in various forms in a multitude of locales within their daily lives. Third, the nature of an individual’s encounter with borders has changed, since this is often mediated via diverse digital devices and managed by private actors. The proliferation of advanced bordering and pre-bordering procedures means that people start crossing borders at the exact moment they buy a plane ticket online from the comfort of their own homes. Fourth, border control has become more individualized, as digitization allows surveillance to zero in on the smallest spaces, such as the body, and continuously monitor them. At the same time, these outcomes have changed the role borders play in the constitution of societies (Amilhat-Szary & Giraut, 2015). The ubiquity of digital border encounters located far from state borderlines means that many people now live with code-like bordering logics all the time. This situation has created a sense of familiarity that makes code-like bordering logics appear apolitical, thus obscuring the power struggles and injustices they carry with them.

The spatiality of these border transformations is of significant interest to political geography because it indicates the re-articulation of relationships between borders, territory, and sovereignty. These new relationships are fluid and foldable, and not simply constitutive of a new territorially discrete political order in the Euclidian sense. Instead, the kind of territoriality they produce can be modulated in multiple ways to achieve different territorial configurations at different times. Put differently, this emergent territoriality materializes from the movement of the flows and the circumstances of constantly unfolding events. The automatic production of space supported by digitization (Thrift & French, 2002) does not easily lend itself to being mapped over existing sovereign territories. Rather, it displays topological characteristics that require us to develop novel concepts of territory and territoriality to work alongside previous ones.

By becoming embedded in the flows, states themselves have not overcome their archetypal territorial moorings, as sovereignty remains formally defined by linear borders. Instead, this embedding has further complicated political processes, creating a new set of tensions between state sovereignty, legal claims of mutual territorial exclusion, and the presence of the state inside flows that cut through state territories and follow non-linear forms of territorial control. It remains unclear whose state authority applies and where, and on what grounds. Power politics and geopolitical grandstanding continue inside the flows albeit under different spatial assumptions.

These non-linear territorial logics can be examined in several contemporary instances. Border security practices in particular have taken a keen interest in the connection between the human body and identity as a means of achieving detailed control over the territoriality of movement. In the digital world of databases, the body achieves spatial co-presence, resulting in non-homogenous geographies. The algorithms querying biometric data fragment the body and then recompose it in databases across space (Amoore, 2009). Although a person may be present at a certain border location, the interpretation of their identity might happen thousands of miles away, and the decision to grant them access might occur at yet another location. It is telling, then, that refugees on their way to Germany begin crossing German borders when they first enter Greece, as their bodily data are recorded into European immigration databases. To understand these geographies, it is not enough to simply analyze the relationship between Greece and Germany. We need to look at the geography of this process in a way that takes into account numerous other places and actors, in addition to national regulations in these two countries and the European Union (EU).

Edward Snowden’s revelations about the US National Security Agency (NSA) global surveillance practices presents another significant opportunity to reflect on the reshaping of sovereignty, borders, and territory in the digital age (Bauman et al., 2014). The NSA has embedded the US borders in a global surveillance flow with the purported goal of keeping the US national territory secure. At work here is a quintessential topological strategy that justifies its purpose in terms of protecting territorial sovereignty, while at the same time undermining the sovereignty of other nation-states. The geographies of NSA surveillance, as they involve a transnational web of security agencies, public authorities, and private corporations, do not sit nicely within a Euclidean territorial template.

The refugee flow from war-torn countries including Syria and Afghanistan traveling from Turkey to Germany is a remarkable example of topologies from below. In their journey across national territories, refugees have relied to an unprecedented degree on digital technologies such as GPS and social media in order to successfully navigate a maze of European borders. The knee-jerk reaction from government entities opposing refugees’ movements has been to erect symbolic border fences around their territories. However, there is more to the relationship between state sovereignty and refugee flows than the encounter between the fence and the digital phone. European territorial borders are already embedded in all kinds of flows, having been moved online through the digitization of personal records and massive database storage. Many refugees’ desire to reach Germany without registering in other countries was rooted in the concern that if their bodily data was entered into immigration databases, according to existing EU regulations at the time, they would be required to settle in these places and would be prevented from entering Germany. The geography of refugee flows is one of nodes and connections, and real-time, remotely coordinated directional shifts, attesting to the fact that digitization and the production of space work hand in hand today. Political geographers need to develop adequate analytical tools to appropriately investigate the nature of these transformations.

Humanitarian borderwork: actors, spaces, categories

Polly Pallister-Wilkins

In late April 2015, the Nobel Prize-winning medical humanitariaan organization Médecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) announced that they would begin Search and Rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean (del Valle, 2016). They joined a large cast of state actors — border police, coastguards, militaries — and other non-state actors engaging in SAR missions aimed at saving the lives of people on the move as they encounter the violence of exclusive sovereign borders (Basaran, 2015). Over the following months MSF found itself active at a range of sites providing, amongst other things, mobile clinics, bus services and transit spaces in Greece and the Western Balkans.

Search and rescue at sea and the provision of basic needs in transit spaces are designed to provide care and uphold human dignity, and have emerged over previous decades to ‘reinvent the border as a space of humanitarian government’ (Walters, 2011, p. 138). As borders have multiplied and states have developed and deepened a range of practices designed to regulate mobility, borders have come to be recognized as spaces of suffering and death (Weber & Pickering, 2011). Here what I term humanitarian borderwork (Rumford, 2008) is oriented around alleviating the worst excesses of the violence of sovereign borders (Hindess, 2006) while also attempting to govern mobility (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). This humanitarian borderwork continues the reconfiguration of the border as a biopolitical space of rescue and the provision of basic needs (Scott-Smith, 2016) while consolidating borders as
selectively permeable spaces of inclusion and exclusion. As such, humanitarian rationalities adjust what political geographers, border studies and critical security studies' scholars have come to understand as borderwork in two key ways. One is by re-orienting border practices around the provisions for particular forms of life, and the other is by introducing humanitarian actors into the borderwork assemblage. As humanitarian borderwork introduces new actors, it also works to produce new types of border spaces constituted around practices of rescue and the provision of basic needs while introducing new categories of life and consolidating socio-political hierarchies.

MSF is only one actor and Europe only one site in this emerging assemblage. Similar humanitarian logics intersect with the policing of movement along the US-Mexico border (J. Williams, 2015) and increasingly come to structure and legitimate externalized border practices, from Australian prevention of irregular boat arrivals (Little & Vaughan-Williams, 2016) to efforts to govern people on the move along the routes of travel by instituting ‘laissez-passer’ transport corridors. The practices that fall under the rubric of humanitarian borderwork marry rationalities of care with those of control and speak to longer-running security practices, as sovereign power has sought to reconcile the needs of mobile populations with territorial sovereignty. These practices include configuring and legitimising externalized border controls as in the Australian case, traditional border control that polices life alongside and within policing mobility and humanitarian actors and political activists purposefully engaging in life-saving as an act of resistance to exclusive sovereignties.

Humanitarian borderwork is part of a different spatial configuration of security focused on the well-being of people on the move, while at the same time intersecting with and sometimes consolidating particular forms of territorial control enacted at the border. As a response to vulnerability at the border, humanitarian borderwork governs this tense relationship to the benefit of state actors concerned with governing mobility, humanitarian actors concerned with governing life, and those people on the move made acutely vulnerable in border spaces and by border regimes. The humanitarian rationalities expressed by some borderworkers, such as EU member-state border police and Frontex (Aas & Gundhus, 2015) are sometimes presented as a tool of legitimation grounded in the powerful subject position carved out by claiming to speak and act for humanity (Feldman & Ticktin, 2010). However, it is important to stress that humanitarian borderwork as a performative response is intimately related to the particular structural politics of the border that prescribe processes of inclusion and exclusion.

‘Border-crossing as a matter of life and death’ (Walters, 2011, p. 138) is mitigated through practices of humanitarianism based on universal ideas of humanity that appear to stand in sharp contrast to the exclusive nature of sovereign states and citizenship (Ballabar, 2009). Such a worldview is encompassed in the name Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders even while humanitarianism in practice works through particular forms of triage that sculpt new categories of life and produce particular subject positions between those in need and those with the power to assist. Humanitarian action, with its claims to de-territorialize universalism and challenge sovereign power over life and death, actually re-territorializes and consolidates sovereignty in practice. SAR operations expand the zones of possible intervention into international waters and are reliant on the permission and guidance of sovereign authorities, while on land the creation of transit spaces along transport routes are in continuous negotiation with local political actors and national authorities.

The focus on borderwork in this intervention stresses the productive nature of the humanitarian action being undertaken in border spaces, while the focus on work also suggests the involvement of active agents in this production. It is to these agents and this production that I now turn, with a focus on the new actors, new spaces and new categories produced through humanitarian borderwork.

There has been a growth in work recognising the presence of humanitarian sensibilities in border policing (Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; J.; Williams, 2015). Rather than running counter to, or directly contradicting, practices of control concerned with regulating mobility in border spaces, humanitarian concerns for life come to structure and offer opportunities for border actors to intervene as they seek not only to govern mobility but also to govern life.

Refugee camps have been the traditional setting where humanitarian actors have enacted their commitment to the provision of the necessary conditions for life. Camp logics instrumentally contain and control mobility so that care can be administered. In humanitarian borderwork, mobility has a different constitutive role, as people on the move challenge traditional humanitarian governance’s camp-based territorialized care (Scott-Smith, 2016). We see care being re-oriented around mobility and humanitarian actors join more traditional border actors such as border police in practices of SAR (del Valle, 2016). In the Mediterranean, SAR is the most prominent form of humanitarian borderwork and has come to determine a large number of the operational duties of the border police and coastguard who are joined by new private philanthropic organizations such as the Migrant Offshore Aid Station, medical humanitarian organizations such as MSF, and more activist-focused groups such as Seawatch. In the southern Mediterranean, border police and humanitarian actors work as part of a border assemblage under sovereign co-ordination, for example the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome.

In these SAR operations that have ‘saved’ 100,000s in the last three years, rescue appears to be the primary motivation, but in practice they are also border-policing operations with sovereign logics. Here the humanitarian imperative to rescue and the Safety of Life at Sea directive expands the space of operations and intervention into international waters, meaning that boats can now be intercepted in international waters whereas before purely border-policing operations could only take place in territorial waters.

Humanitarian borderwork is also practiced along the routes of people on the move and becomes territorialized in transport hubs and in border spaces where mobility is interrupted. These are often temporary, transit spaces reflecting the temporality of care provision itself as an ‘emergency’, stopgap measure, and they are constituted through an intimate relationship with mobility. Across the European bordertscape these transit spaces appear at ports, along major transport arteries, at railway stations and at border crossing points, and are produced by an assemblage of people on the move, humanitarian actors, border police, and borders themselves.

Within these spaces a range of practices concerned with care giving occur based on particular categories of life. These categories iterate existing categories of mobility such as refugee or migrant while producing new categories based on vulnerability and need. At times these new categories of life built around vulnerability and need challenge the traditional binary between refugees and migrants that underpins the refugee regime. This regime, based as it is on particular liberal understandings of risk separating the political from the socio-economic and consolidating territorial sovereignty through its relationship with border crossing, is seen by some humanitarian actors as limiting. In such instances humanitarian organizations like MSF stress that they treat people based on need, not their legal status. In fact, I first encountered the term ‘people on the move’ being used by MSF as a way of moving beyond the
refugee/migrant binary.

That said, certain categories of life reflect vulnerability for particular categories of people such as those denied safe and legal routes through a variety of legal and bureaucratic measures governing mobility. These categories of life also cement existing social hierarchies between those with the power to act and those reliant on assistance while generating differentiations within and between people on the move themselves. Here vulnerability and need are often influenced by pre-existing attitudes towards ‘who’ is understood as a humanitarian ‘victim’. Hierarchies and differentiations develop or are reproduced between genders, between children and adults, and between people according to national origin. Therefore, humanitarian borderwork produces categories of life around those considered in need of assistance such as women and children in conjunction with new border spaces and practices designed to administer to and relieve such suffering.

Humanitarian borderwork is very diverse in terms of actors and border spaces because of its contingent relationship with mobility. Fluctuating assemblages of actors with divergent socio-political objectives undertake humanitarian borderwork. These actors share humanitarian sensibilities but perform acts of rescue and caregiving for reasons that cannot be considered ‘wholly’ humanitarian. Humanitarian SAR logic is used by border-policing missions that mobilize humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian borderwork is therefore indicative of the instrumental and normative logics present in much humanitarian work, where pragmatic security concerns intersect with affective concerns for people’s wellbeing and dignity.

Reconceptualizing borders as islands

Alison Mountz

In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015, p. 2) announced the highest global rates of displacement since World War II, with 65.3 million people forcibly displaced worldwide. This statistic was accompanied by news of associated increases in asylum claims globally in 2013, 2014, and 2015 (UNHCR, 2015). In the face of the acute, global problem of displacement, nation-states have responded by investing in historically high measures in enclosure. They have built walls and provisional fences, as in the 2015 partial re-bordering of the European Union (EU) in response to the mass displacement of Syrians and others crossing the Mediterranean. In addition to tightening and re-drawing borders, states expanded detention globally. According to Sampson (2013, pp. 9–10), more countries are detaining, and those that do detain have expanded infrastructure and policy and legal instruments to do so.

Much of this expansion is happening offshore along transit corridors and in regions such as Central America, North Africa, and Eastern Europe. Wealthier, traditionally ‘immigrant-receiving’ countries are shutting down paths to asylum, offshoring borders and containing people in the global south so that most Syrians displaced, as one example, are in fact displaced in the region, with the vast majority in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

The main geographical thrust in border enforcement has been to push borders and people trying to reach sovereign territory offshore and to confine them in ever-smaller and more remote locations. Both trends are well-established in existing literature with what is often referred to as externalization of enforcement (e.g. Coleman, 2007) and the growing trend of carceral or detention studies (e.g. Moran, Gill, & Conlon, 2013). In my research, the convergence of these two trends is clear: people are not only thwarted offshore in their migration journeys, they are detained en route. In other words, border enforcement has not only moved offshore, but is deployed to enclose, contain, and confine people far away from aspirational destinations where they seek entry and asylum. As a result of these trends, political asylum is in crisis, and islands have come to the fore as sites of struggle over entry and exclusion.

Amid these global trends of acute displacement and extreme confinement, I argue that the co-constituted spatial forms of state border enforcement and migrant border crossings have shifted. If transnational migration ever involved the spatial metaphor of a crossing — as in crossing the line — this metaphor has now been replaced by a proliferating series of spaces of confinement experienced along circuitous and precarious transnational routes. People on the move in search of protection and livelihood are likely to cross multiple borders and experience multiple periods and spaces of confinement throughout their journey, across national contexts, at sea and on land. The geographical metaphor of the crossing must therefore be replaced by that of the island: border as island. This re-imagination of the spatial form of border enforcement is a conceptual response to empirical evidence. To develop this argument, I draw on research on detention and asylum seeking on islands, where a key finding was the reproduction of the form of the island. In other words, people are not only detained remotely on islands, but detained remotely and isolated within islands in high security facilities or solitary confinement. Research findings showed the proliferation of the spatial form of the island beyond the island itself. Together, these two trends—the use of islands and the reproduction of the spatial form of the island—constitute the transformation of border enforcement from a focus on the line to that of the island.

Designing spaces of confinement to detain migrants is not new; the detention industry has been well-established since the 1990s. However, the contemporary proliferation of confinement results from intensified investments by governments and precipitous growth in business of the global prison industry (Conlon & Hiemstra, 2016). This proliferation and intensification fuels new state practices: unprecedented investments in material and human resources (including government authorities and third parties such as the International Organization for Migration). In research on islands in recent years, I found that this intensification contributed to the reproduction of the form of the island.

In the name of deterrence, states invest remarkable resources in offshoring on islands and beyond in the enforcement archipelago (Mountz, 2011). Remote detention is resource-intensive due to the costs of transporting detainees, workers, and supplies long distances. Additionally, funds were invested in building high security facilities and renovating facilities to be more secure and to segregate and isolate those detained there, separating new arrivals, families, men from women, and adding solitary confinement cells. This signals the reproduction of islands within islands.

By enforcement archipelago, I refer to assemblages of ever more dispersed tactics, practices, people, infrastructure that mediate access to sovereign territory. Between 2006 and 2015, for example, EU member states invested some 299 million euros in marine enforcement through Frontex (K. Williams & Mountz, 2016). During this period, the US border enforcement budget increased precipitously, with the US Department of Homeland Security spending approximately $19 billion annually on including interception, detention, and deportation. While most research shows that enforcement is not particularly effective as a deterrence strategy, it is big business.

Proliferating spaces of confinement also express the precarity that has been the subject of much scholarship in migration studies in recent years (e.g. Vosko, Preston, & Latham, 2014). In sites of confinement, people on the move bear the burden of material investments in border enforcement. Scholarship shows that as
enforcement intensifies, so too does precarity (K. Williams & Mountz, 2016). Contemporary transnational journeys also show intensification of trauma and violence en route (e.g. Brigden, 2016). Australia offers an extreme case for its literal use of islands to detain and its construction of an extensive enforcement archipelago on foreign territory across the region where it is situated. This began with Prime Minister John Howard’s development of the “Pacific Solution” in 2001. The Solution involved legislation to excise many parts of coastal Australian territory from Australia for the purposes of migration. This move reduced access to asylum through creation of a two-tiered system of access. People who could reach sovereign territory would access more rights and representation than those held offshore on Australian Overseas Territory of Christmas Island, Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island, and Nauru.

Over time, through subsequent regional “solutions” and changes in policy, more territory in the region was exploited for Australian migration management. Asylum seekers were held in facilities across Malaysia and Indonesia. In 2013, conservative leadership implemented Operation Sovereign Borders, which handed over control to military authorities who endeavored to intercept all ships, turn many of them back, and detain all asylum seekers to Australia on Manus and Nauru. In November 2016, the United States announced a “third party resettlement agreement”: it would resettle 1616 people who had received refugee status, yet remained in detention on the two islands (Karp & Farrell, 2016). Still others remained in detention on the two islands with no options for resettlement in Australia.

Some people we interviewed spent many years in sites of confinement in different places across the archipelago. For example, people interviewed on Christmas Island and on mainland territory in detention had previously been in detention in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nauru. They experienced the dynamic movement of the border that affixed itself to the body even as they were forcibly moved through detention. Even those who entered mainland sovereign territory were still excluded, treated as islands within the legal system (Taylor, 2005). As a result of such extreme border enforcement, boats adrift also became islands. In 2014, for example, thousands of Rohingya were at sea in the Indian Ocean, searching yet not finding safe haven, constituting a humanitarian crisis in the region.

Enforcement archipelagoes are also growing more extensive in countries neighboring the United States. There, proliferating spaces of confinement are not necessarily or exclusively on islands (although the US does detain in the Marianas and Hawai’i). Instead, islands take the form of la bestia, a notorious mode of train transit that Central Americans take through México, that has been the subject of scrutiny and violence undertaken by authorities and gangs against migrants. Migrants also seek safe haven and face confinement in an archipelago of closed migrant shelters where they sleep at times along the way. Brigden (2016) and others write about these proliferating spaces of Central American passage and stasis through Mexico where people are precarious and subjected to violence from authorities and others as they travel from southern to northern border. In response to the 2014 surge in entries and claims from Central American youth, the US responded in three ways: opened new detention centers onshore; attempted to process claims in countries of origin; and added to the $2.5 billion already invested in enforcement through the Mérida Initiative from 2007 to 2015 to bolster border enforcement in Mexico (Seeke & Finklea, 2016, p. 2).

In the enforcement archipelago, the spatial forms of borderlines and borderlands have been supplanted by islands, with proliferating spaces of confinement becoming the primary spatial form of exclusion: border becomes island. Transnational journeys across borders have shifted from the spatial metaphors that iconoclast border studies scholar Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) once wrote about: the line as crossing or hybridity. For Anzaldúa, living close to the line in the borderlands meant hybrid forms of identity, incorporating self and other and multiple languages and cultures. Borders and transit corridors are increasingly experienced as a proliferating series of spaces of confinement. Instead of a crossing, people encounter remote detention and lack mobility in transit, in detention, through legal systems and asylum procedures.

Borders and transnational migration involving unauthorized entry confront the global intensification of detention and corresponding shrinking of routes to and spaces of asylum. In each case discussed, wealthy countries exercise power in the willingness, resources, and ability to invest in detention offshore, often resulting in the conversion of islands themselves from spaces of passage and safe haven to spaces of expulsion (Andriajasevic, 2010).

I attend in my work to the degree to which an island is a unique location, one whose particular history and location factors into its use as a site of detention. And yet I find islands everywhere in the development of state enforcement practices. On mainland territories, enforcement and detention facilities are often hidden from view, again separating and isolating people through their remote confinement, restricting their access to rights and protections. Meanwhile, island communities, landscapes, and infrastructure have transitioned from safe haven to carceral space with those detained increasingly isolated and segregated from each other in situ. I have argued that we are seeing a significant transformation from border-crossing to island, as border enforcement is intensified on and offshore. This shift raises new lines of research driven by empirical and conceptual inquiry to determine patterns where island detention is happening. Conceptually, if the island is the new camp, as the camp was conceptualized by Giorgio Agamben (1998), researchers must explore the lasting moral, economic, legal, and political consequences for asylum-seeking wrought by the extraordinary investments by states in confinement.

Spatializing the state in border studies

Emily Gilbert

What role does the state play in contemporary border politics? From the perspective of migration, states continue to play a predominant role with respect to setting out legislation, making decisions about admissibility, and providing (some) settlement services (Mountz, 2010). And yet, the state is not all-pervasive. This is especially clear with Canada’s turn to private sponsorship to help relocate nearly 30,000 Syrian refugees. While these refugees continuously bump up against the state and its bureaucracy, much of the support that they are provided with has been devolved onto the community. Turning to consider border security, we can also see how the role of the state is changing. At the Canada-US border, not only are border functions contracted out to the private sector, but bi-national agreements are creating new forms of cross-border law enforcement programs, such as the Shiprider agreement, that challenge the principles of state autonomy, hegemony and legal sovereignty. Whether from the perspective of migration or security, the state’s role vis-à-vis borders are changing. Yet, as I will suggest, in neither case do we find a “retreat of the state” (Strange, 1996). Rather, the state continues to loom large, even if its role is more complicated, with different pressure points where it is more visible and visceral. I want to delve into this complication, first from the perspective of migration, and then with respect to security.

One of the campaign promises made by Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party in Canada’s 2015 federal election, was that it would welcome 25,000 refugees from Syria by the end of the year. At that time, the
Conservative government had only committed to accepting 1300 refugees, and only a few hundred has actually arrived in Canada. Once elected, Trudeau quickly moved to enact his promise—and although the original timeline was not met, by the end of March 2016, just over 26,000 Syrians had arrived in Canada. This mass migration depended on an enormous mobilization by the state. But this initiative also depended on an outpouring of support by communities across Canada. Of the first 26,000 refugees who arrived in Canada, 11,000 arrived either through a private sponsorship (8,976) or a blended visa office-referral which is new partnership model between government and private groups (2,225).

Canada’s private sponsorship program is unique. The only other country with a formal private sponsorship scheme in place is Australia, which it implemented in 2015, following the Canadian model. Ireland and Switzerland are testing out private sponsorship, as are fifteen of Germany’s sixteen constituent states. Britain, New Zealand and Argentina are also considering private sponsorship. The Canadian program emerged in 1978 in response to the tens of thousands of people who were fleeing the ravages of war in Vietnam. When the Canadian government finally opened its doors to refugees, it did so only on the agreement that every government-sponsored refugee was matched by a privately-sponsored refugee. The provision for private sponsorship was included in the revised Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 1976, and allowed organizations or small groups of people to sponsor refugees. The program proved to be very popular. By December 1980—in an 18 month period—32,000 privately-sponsored refugees had arrived in Canada (Adelman, 1992). Since then, more than 275,000 refugees have settled in Canada under the private sponsorship programme.

The most significant difference between privately- and government-sponsored refugees is who assumes financial and settlement responsibility. With government-sponsored refugees, the costs of travel and resettlement are borne by the government, although the refugees are expected to pay-back the costs of travel and the medical checks necessary to their application. (In the case of the refugees from Syria, an exception was made and these costs were paid by the government.) With private-sponsorship, the sponsors pay all the costs of travel, accommodation, food and living expenses for 12 months, or until the newcomers are self-sufficient, whichever comes first. Monies are paid either out of personal funds and/or through fundraising. Private sponsors are also responsible for all the necessary resettlement assistance, from finding interpreters, to filling in government paperwork, to providing emotional support, getting children enrolled in school and adults in English language classes, setting up medical and dental appointments, etc. In the blended model, the costs are shared over the first 12 months, but the sponsorship group is still required to provide most of the settlement support.

Some have suggested that private sponsored programs are better able to help refugees integrate, while others have criticized the lack of consistency (e.g. Adelman, 1992). What I am interested in looking at here, however, is the role of the state. There is no question that the private sponsorship programs download responsibility for costs and care away from the state onto volunteers in the community. In this sense, we can speak of a “retreat” of the state. But the state certainly does not disappear. It continues to determine the broad contours of the program, such as the number of refugees admitted and the selection process. For example, the Trudeau government made the (somewhat) controversial decision to exclude single men, except those persecuted for their homosexuality, on security grounds. With respect to private sponsorship, the state also manages the program through extensive layers of bureaucracy, agreements with Sponsorship Agreement Holder (such as churches), with dozens of forms and hundreds of stipulations around settlement plan, police checks, and insurance coverage. The reach of the state is also deep with respect to the kinds of special programs (e.g. language learning) that refugees can access, or services such as health care (e.g. a special Interim Federal Health Certificate), and rules as to whether families might qualify for tax rebates such as the child tax credit.

With respect to refugee politics, even when responsibility is devolved onto the community, the state retains an “authority,” so that the country’s “established geographic borders” are articulated and sovereignty reinforced (Sassen, 2015, p. 23). For those refugees who arrive under private sponsorships, community sponsors take on this role of making them “legible” to the state, while also making the state “legible” to the new arrivals (cf. Scott, 1998). In this sense, the reach of the state can be said to be even more pervasive in the case of private sponsorships, as members of the community are interpolated as translators of state functions. Furthermore, as most refugees are low-income, their contact with the state is onerous, as they navigate not only formal programs and services but also all the bureaucracy required to provide them with exemptions or exceptions. Their lives continue to be vulnerable and precarious—but not because they are abandoned by the state. Indeed, in many ways the state intervenes in the lives of the marginalized much more extensively than ever before.

Turning to consider innovations in border security, however, focuses attention on quite different processes. States are increasingly securitizing and even militarizing their borders (e.g. Jones & Johnson, 2016; Jones, 2012) and this is no less true at the Canada-US border (Gilbert, 2012). Although a physical wall has not been built—yet!—a virtual security fence has been erected through the use of technologies such as mobile surveillance systems, remote video surveillance systems and thermal cameras, as well as drones flown by US Customs and Border Protection.

This defensive approach to border security is usually taken as an articulation of state sovereignty, even if that sovereignty is said to be on the wane (Brown, 2010). But the actual arrangements around border security belie a much more complicated scenario that depends on bilateral cooperation and collaboration. For example, Canada and the US have agreed to the Shiprider program (formally known as Integration Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations). The Shiprider program applies to shared waterways, and allows designated law enforcement officers to work side-by-side on vessels on either side of the border. Effectively, the boats and their agents can cross over the maritime border in pursuit of suspects. Designated Canadian personnel assume the powers of customs officers under US Code Title 19: no legal changes were required. In Canada, legislation was passed to accord designated US personnel similar status to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, not only in a maritime cross-border operation, but also any “incidental” activity that arises, from “hot pursuit” on land or in the air, to subsequent court cases. US agents are now authorized to cross over the border with their guns and enforce Canadian law.

In the words of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Shiprider removes the international maritime boundary as a barrier to law enforcement by enabling seamless continuity of enforcement and security operations across the border” (emphasis added) (RCMP, 2015). The Shiprider agreement thus dramatically reconfigures maritime, terrestrial and even air borders, and challenges notions of state sovereignty and legal autonomy (Pratt, 2014). Just as the border is increasingly securitized, it is also being erased. This raises a number of problems regarding sovereignty, extra-territorial legal jurisdiction and accountability (Harris, 2013). What happens when something goes wrong? How will the officer be held accountable? Under which jurisdiction? And under whose authority?

From an indigenous perspective, however, Shiprider is a further example of the imposition of state power, and a repudiation of their
own sovereignty. One of the key regions where Shiprider is in place is along the St. Lawrence River, which cuts through the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne. The Council has identified two main problems with Shiprider. First, that the “armed gunships patrolling Akwesasne waterways are an inflammatory gesture that could spark undesired conflict between our two peoples” (Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs, 2011). Second, Shiprider is “an infringement of Haudenosaunee sovereignty” since there was no consultation. The lack of consultation and the militarization, they argue, are in contravention of Articles 19 and 30 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. For the Mohawk, then, Shiprider denotes not a demise of state sovereignty, but rather its apotheosis. Into the 21st century, borders continue to be reworked. The examples of migration and border security from Canada are indicative of the complexity of these changes, whereby there is both a “retreat” of the state and a “rearticulation of state sovereignty” (Jones & Johnson, 2016). Yet states continue to act as if they are sovereign entities, even as the fiction of the absolutism is more and more difficult to sustain, as migration policy and border security programs are reworked. The state is nothing if not resilient. For those who encounter the state, especially the most marginal-ized whose identities have been imposed on them by the very constitution of these national borders—such as refugees and indigenous peoples—the state presses upon them with vigour, and with resilience.

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